Introduction
\Vhen a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absence of fraud, or, I will add, misrepresentation the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not.1
This often cited dicta of Scrutton LJ in L 'Estrange v Graucob is premised on the traditional theories of freedom of contract and the objective view of contract law.2 Under these approaches the courts , primary function was perceived as being to give effect to what the parties had agreed. A party to a written agreement was taken to have consented to be bound, in a disputed case, by the interpretation which a court might place on the language of the instrument.
By and large the Jaw was concerned with objective appearance, rather than actual intention.3 The primary justification given by the courts in su ;port of such an approach was the need to ensure the integrity of business transactions. Thus if a party signed a document containing contractual terms that party would be bound by the document, irrespective of whether or not it had been read. Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394 at 403 per Scrutton LJ.
Nevertheless, the law recognises some exceptions including non est /ttctum, misrepresentation and, in limited circumstances, mistake. In addition, the expanded doctrine of 'unconscionability' has also emerged as an exception to the rule in L 'Estrange v Graucob by recognising the undesirability of enforcing a contract (even if it has been signed) in circumstances where to do so would be Although the principle for which the decision stands has been said to reflect an estoppel, it is not a true example of estoppel because the party who proffers the document does not rely on the signature as an acknowledgment of the conditions and act on it to his detriment. That patty knows or has reason to know that the other party has not read mld assented to the specific conditions. Nor does the principle rest on reliance. Instead it seems to be based on the importance of a formal signature and the need to exclude an inquiry into the reality of assent. The requirements of fairness and justice may weB ca11 for its re-examination. 7
One of the difficulties with L 'Estrange v Graucob is determining whether a document, or transaction, is contractual. For example, Stephen Graw, in his text. states that a document will be contractual in nature:
if it is of a kind which members of the public generally regard as contractual; or if the person who receives it knows either that it is contractual or that it contains terms that govern his or her dealings with the profferens. 8
The primary purpose of this article is to analyse the recent decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Le Mans Grand Prix Circuits Pry Ltd v lliadis (Le Mans/. The case is interesting because the court split 2-1 on whether the document, signed by the plaintiff, or the transaction that he entered into, was contractual. In so doing. the court had to consider the applicability of the rule in L "Estrange v Graucob,
Le Mans Gmnd PrLt Circuits Pty Ltd v Iliad is
The Facts
The plaintiff was injured whilst driving a go-kart at the defendant's racetrack. The plaintiff was attending a promotional function by a local radio station, 3MP, which had booked the defendant's racetrack for a 'corporate function' night for staff members, family and friends, The plaintiff, being an invited guest, did not pay a fee for his attendance at the track.
In evidence, the plaintiff said that he was asked to "sign a particular form so that you can register your name to be able to do a lap of the go-kart race and once I did that I was qualified to drive the faster vehicle." 10 The plaintiff signed the form without reading it.
He stated that he was rushed into signing it because there were a number of people However, it appears that at the trial the only claim pursued was negligence.
Apat1 from denying negligence the defendant sought to rely on an exemption clause in the document which the plaintiff had signed. The trial Judge found that the defendant had been negligent on the basis that it had allowed the plaintiff to engage in go-kart racing, an inherently dangerous pastime, without "sufficient education, instruction, experience and testing.'' On the issue of the exemption clause the trial Judge had concluded:
Reliance was placed on a disclaimer which was apparently signed by the plaintiff ... The disclaimer itself is in such broad terms that I quite frankly do not understand unless it purports to be a blanket disposal of any legal responsibility at all, what it actually does mean. Le Mans Grand Prix Circuits Pty Ltd\' Jliadis, supra n 9 at 663.
The full text of the document is set out at 669 of the court's judgment. Supran 11.
Ibid at 664.
(1986) 161 CLR 500.
The focus of the majority judgment. Tadgell JA (with whom Witmeke P agreed). was on whether the document signed by the plaintiff was contractual, or alternatively if the parties were in a contractual relationship. It is with this issue, rather than the interpretation of the document, that this at1icle concentrates.
Tadgell JA, after reciting the facts and background to the appeal. refetTed to the ticket cases where it was held that reasonable notice \Vas required before an exemption clause could be relied upon.16 His Honour then went on to deal with the defendant's argument that signing a document denotes an acknowledgment of the document and a consent to the written contents.
After briefly examining the basis of the rule in L 'Estrange v Graucob. Tadgell JA noted that it has been subject to criticism. His Honour referred to Greig and Davis17 who argue that if the signing party has reasonable grounds tOr believing that the document is not contractual a court should not hold the party bound by its contents. The same authors suggest that the rule might also not apply in a situation where there is no practical opportunity for a party to read the document before signing.1 8
Tadgell JA also referred to the views of Mason and Gageler, as summarised in the introduction to this ar1icle, and to the criticism of the rule in L 'Estrange v Graucob by Spencer,1 9 who argues that a defence should be available to a person based on the fact "that he simply did not agree to the term in question" 20
Tadgell JA determined that it was not necessary to examine in detail the universal validity or desirability of the 'objective theory of contract' because of his finding that there was no contractual relationship between the parties in this case. 2 1 "The [plaintiff's] attendance at the [defendant's] track, and his participation in go-kart racing were not obviously in pursuance or in the course of a commercial dealing or relationship with the [plaintiff] ." "
In support of this conclusion his Honour observed that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had paid a fee (it will be recalled that 3MP booked the racetrack). Nor were participants given any notice or indication that any contractual relationship was to exist between them and the racetrack, only a Jicence to drive. 23
His Honour referred to the plaintiff's lack of opportunity to read the form, the highlighted part of the document ('TO HELP WITH OUR ADVERTISING') and the lack of explanation fi·om the defendant's employees regarding the document, and concluded: Supra n 11 at 667.
Ibid.
Ibid at 668.
Nor is there any satisfactory evidence that the [plaintiff] or any other patticipant was asked to read the form or to treat it as anything more than a registration or application form for the purpose of obtaining a so-called licence to drive a go-kart. It might be thought that the information which the person signing was asked to provide in the form -name. address, telephone number and date of birth and date of signing -was consistent with that. It is not easy to see-at least in the absence of explanation-why a statement of the date of birth was otherwise relevant. 24
In the light of tllis finding his Honour did not need to consider the interpretation of the exemption clause. In essence. his Honour found that the document which the plaintiff had signed was not contractual. bearing in mind the facts surrounding the obtaining of the plain tift's signature.
Dissenting Judgment of Batt JA
A large pati of Batt JA'sjudgment was concerned with the interpretation to be given to the signed document in this case. This aspect of the case will not be discussed in detail because� as already mentioned, this article is rimre concerned with the effect a pa1ty's signature has on a document. Batt JA found that 3MP was not an agent of the plaintiff, documents in those cases (delivery dockets and cart notes) were not contractual.
Furthermore. the signing of the documents took place after the contracts had been concluded.
The plaintiff also argued that no contract existed between him and the defendant on the ground that the defendant had failed to perfmm all of the acts expressed as constituting consideration in the document he had signed, in particular. the failure to 'hire' the 'go kart' to him. Clearly the 'hire' was to 3MP. His Honour dismissed this argument on the grounds that the 'hire' to 3MP for delivery to its staff and their friends for their use constituted consideration.31
Batt JA then proceeded to deal with the exceptions to the rule in L '&trange 1' Gmucub and found that there was no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by the defendant.
His Honour also noted the academic and judicial criticism of the rule in L 'Estrange 1' Graucob but concluded that Mason and Gageler had simply stated that the requirements of fairness and justice may well cal1 for re-examination of the principle. He observed that Dr. Finn (as he then was) in the same text32 appeared to accept the correctness of the statement of Scrutton U. Batt JA also referred to the judgments of Dawson J in The plaintiff also attempted to argue that where a clause is onerous or unusual then actual notice is required. Reference was made to lntelfoto Picture LibrmJI Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programme Ltd.35 Batt JA distinguished that case on the basis that the delivery note was unsigned, whereas here "signing affords the person who signs the opportunity to become aware of the contents of the document."3 6
Finally, Batt JA dealt with the interpretation of the exemption clause and concluded: Honour refers to criticism of the rule and one is left with the impression by the general tenor of his Honour's judgment that he has some sympathy with this criticism.
Ultimately, however, Tadgell JA did not need to address the issue as he found that the plaintiff and defendant were not in a contractual relationship.
There is another aspect ofTadgcll JA's judgrnent which merits discussion. His Honour said:
Counsel for the [defendant] was disposed to concede in his reply that contractual documents containing an onerous exemptive provision must be brought to the notice of the party against whom they are to be enforced. and contended that in this case the provision in question was so brought. This obiter appears to be a guarded acceptance of the view that something extra must be In modern commercial practice, many standard form printed documents are signed without being read or understood. In many cases the parties seeking to rely upon the tem1s of the contract know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract does not represent the true intention of the signer, and that the party signing is tmaware of the stringent and onerous provisions which the standard form contains. Under such circumstances, I
am of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such tenns should not be able to do so in the absence of first having taken reasonable measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and, in the absence of such reasonable measures, it is not necessary for the party denying Despite these observations, it must be said that on this issue the law in Australia remains uncertain. As noted in the judgment of Batt JA. referred to earlier. there is substantial authority to suggest that the rule in L 'Estrange v Graucob still prevails. and that knowledge of the written contents of a document will be presumed if it is signed by a party. It is only where a contractual document has been received by a party and not signed that a different rule applies. namely. that the party relying on the document's terms must establish that reasonable or sufticient notice of those terms was given to the other party. This approach is supported by Batt JA in this case. who referred to the lnteJfoto case but distinguished it on the basis that the document involved in that case was unsigned.
Whilst there may be some doubt as to whether the failure to bring onerous clauses to the notice of a party prior to signing a document avoids the rule in L 'Estrange v Graucob.
an acknowledged exception to the rule is the existence of a 'misrepresentation·. In Le
Mans it is interesting that both Tadgell JA and Batt JA concluded that there was no misrepresentation by the defendant in relation to the document which the plaintiff had
signed. Yet in evidence the plaintiff said that he was advised that his signature was required so that he could drive a faster vehicle. Unfortunately. because of the paucity of evidence the authors are unable to comment further, except perhaps to say that this aspect could have been examined in more depth by the court, bearing in mind cases like There are two further issues that were not even argued before either the trial Judge or the Appeal Court in Le Mans, namely, the applicability of the implied terms of the Trade Practices Act and the doctrine of 'unconscionability'. Section 74 of the 1)·ade
Practices Act provides, inter alia, that in a contract for supply by a corporation of services to a 'consumer' 45 there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care and skill. In this case the defendant was a corporation. 'Services' is defined in s 4(I)(a)(ii) as including "the provision of, or of the use or enjoyment of facilities for, amusement, entertainment, recreation or instruction", which would appear
Ibid at 408-9.
[l95t]t KB 805. Stevenson (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. '" lends some support to the argument that documents of the type signed by the plaintiff in Le Mans are unconscionable. Without going into the facts in detail, in the George Collings case a signed agreement was set aside on the grounds that the document was "incorrectly and unfairly entitled" " and because onerous provisions had been "submerged in the fine print of the contracf'. It will be recalled that in Le Mans the bold red print highlighted at the start of the document signed by the plaintiff suggested that it was a 'marketing' document, when in fact it purported to be contractual and contained an 'onerous' exemption clause. Whilst not necessarily suggesting that the document was 'unconscionable' in this case, as the plaintiff was not under any apparent disability, 50 it would at least seem to have been an argument worth raising.
Conclusion
Le Mans highlights the importance of the legislative provisions incorporated in the Trade Practices Act, and parallel State legislation, which are designed to counter the use of exemption clauses in 'consumer' contracts. Furthermore, the attention given to L 'Estrange v Graucob in the case underlines the tension between the need for certainty as compared to faimess in contractual transactions.
Spencer has argued in relation to L 'Estrange v Graucob:
The truth is that \Vhatever may have been Graucob Ltd.'s intentions disreputable companies put harsh clauses in minute print in order to 'put one It must be said, however, that such cases will be rare. In this day and age, the bottom line is that even when a contractual transaction has been entered into, if it involves a 'consumer' acquiring goods or services, the 'consumer' is protected against the unfair use of exemption clauses by the other party, and has non-excludable rights guaranteeing the quality and standard of the goods or services pursuant to Div 2 of Pt V of the Trade Practices Act and equivalent State legislation. The existence of these rights is perhaps still not widely appreciated.
5I
Supra n 19 at 116. Although Tadgell JA refers to Spencer's criticism it is unfortunate that his Honour does not give any clear indication as to whether he endorsed the authors' view. Tadgell JA felt there was no need to do so because of his ultimate finding that there was no contractual relationship between the parties.
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